A Note on the Determinants of AFDC Policies by Cebula, Richard
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A Note on the Determinants of AFDC
Policies
Richard Cebula
Jacksonville University
2. January 1980
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/51560/
MPRA Paper No. 51560, posted 18. November 2013 21:14 UTC
A note on the determinants of AFDC policies 
 
 
 
RICHARD  J. CEBULA* 
 
Emory Universit y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the United States, there exist enormous geographic welfare (especially AFDC) 
differentials.  Such differentials have been examined by numerous scholars in recent 
years (for example, Albin and Stein, 1971; Cebula, 1976; Orr, 1976; and Tresch 
1975). Along these lines, in a recent issue of Public Choice, Spall (1978) addresses 
the determinants of AFDC levels in states. The purpose of this Note is not to criticize 
the study by Spall (1978); rather, the purpose of this Note is simply to offer an  
alternative analysis of the determinants  of geographic AFDC differentials. In 
particular, the model tested below hypothesizes a basically political determination 
of AFDC levels, a political determination principally involving an alignment of 
two socio-economic groups: (1) the very poor (actual AFDC recipients) and (2) 
those who are probably (although not current actual) AFDC recipients. 
 
 
 
2. The model 
 
This paper argues that AFDC levels are significantly influenced by a political 
alignment involving persons who are currently receiving AFDC benefits and 
persons who believe that they are likely to become AFDC recipients. 
It is argued that eligible voters who are actual AFDC recipients have strong 
incentives to support AFDC increases. For one thing, actual AFDC recipients gain 
directly and significantly from such increases because AFDC benefits are a very 
sizeable proportion of the total income of such persons. In addition, as a pragmatic 
matter, AFDC recipients on the average do not bear any con- sequential direct 
additional tax burden as a result of AFDC increases; in point of fact, the taxes used 
to finance AFDC increases are principally borne by non-welfare recipients (see 
Aronson and Schwartz, 1973; and Von Furstenberg and 
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M ueller, 1971). Thus, AFDC recipients are likely to vote in favor of AFDC 
increases because they reap su bstantial  net benefits from such policies. It 
follows that AFDC increses are likel y to be an increasing function of the actual 
n umber of AFDC recipients. 
On a somewhat different level, there may exist persons in society who, while 
not currently receiving AFDC benefits, may believe that they are likely to 
become welfare eligible at some fu ture time. Itis argued here that persons wh o 
believe that they are likely to become AFDC recipients may wish to support 
policies to raise AFDC levels since they view themsel ves as potential direct 
benefactors of such increases. Whether a person envisions himself as a potent- 
ial AFDC recipient is of cource likel y to depend upon a variety of forces, some 
economic and some not. This paper argues that the unemployment rate 
among non-welfare recipients is likely to be a critical factor here. In particular, 
it is argued that the higher the unemployment rate among non-welfare 
recipients, the greater the degree to which non-welfare recipien ts are likely to 
view themselves as potential welfare recipients (and hence as potential 
benefactors of welfare hikes). Therefore, the higher the u nempl oyment rate 
among non-welfare recipients, the greater the degree to which non-welfare 
recipients are likely to align themselves at the polls with actual AFDC 
recipients in support of welfare hikes. It foll ows, then, that the higher this 
unemployment rate, the greater the likelihood of passage of AFDC increases. 
 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
To test the above hypothesis, we postulate the following regression m odel: 
 
AF DC i = a0  + a1 POVi + a2  U i + a 3 Di + z (1) 
 
where AF DCi = !971 AFDC level, per recipient, in state i 
 
a0  = constan t term 
PO Vi = measure of the proporti on of state i' s 1970 population that was 
receiving A FDC benefits 
Ui = meaure of the unemploymen t rate of ad ul t non-welfare recipi- 
ents in state i , 1970 
Di = d umm y variabl e to indicate whether state iis a 'warm whether' 
state (Di = 1 if the state is so classified and Di = 0 otherwise) 1 
z = stochastic error term 
 
The variable POVi measures the  proporti on of state i' s population that is 
receiving public welfare in the form of AFDC. It follows from the brief 
discussion  in  Section  2  that  we  should  expect  a 1 > 0, ceteris paribus.  The 
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variable Ui is used to measure the probability that persons who are not actual 
AFDC recipients (but who are poten tial AFDC reci pients) will align them- 
selves at the polls with actual welfare recipients. Following Section 2, it is 
argued here that a2 > 0, ceteris paribus. Finally, the dummy variable Di is 
inclu ded to help con tr ol for the fact in man y of the so-call ed 'warm weather' 
states there is a history of conservative political philisophy and hence a 
tendency to keep welfare (A FDC, in this case) levels l ower. Thus, ceteris 
paribus, we expect that a 3  < 0. 
The OLS estimate of (l ) is given by: 
 
 
AF DCi = + 0.53147 + 0.00001 POVi + 0.00894 Ui - 0.26542 Di, (2) 
( + 0.56) ( + 2.89) ( + 6.25 ( -5.71) 
D F = 46, R 2  = .4648, D - W = 2.0395, F-statistic = 13.3138 
 
where term s in parenthese are t-values. 
The resul ts in equation (2) are quite strong. All three estimated coefficients 
have the ex pected signs; furthermore, all three of the coefficients are statistical- 
ly significant at the .01 l evel or beyond. In addition, the F-ratio is statistically 
significant at far beyond the .01 level. 
The above resul ts strongly imply that AFDC levels will be higher in th ose 
states where the proportion of the population 'on welfare' (receiving AFDC) is 
greater. The results in (2) also impl y that AFDC levels will be greater in those 
states where the unemployment rate among adult non-welfare recipients is 
higher. 
 
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
 
The above results may be interpreted, as follows: political pressure to raise 
welfare (A FDC) levels is greater in those states where the population actually 
receiving welfare (AFDC) is greater and where unemployment among adult 
non-welfare reci pients (who may expect to become welfa re-eligible) is greater. 
Ifhigher welfare (AFDC) levels act to attract an influx of additional welfare- 
eligible voters, these additional voters may align with the voter pools de- 
scribed in Section 2 to raise A FDC levels even further. The end result could be 
a pattern  of ever-growing geographical  AFDC differentials. 2 
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NOTES 
 
 
l. Data were obtained from various issues of the Statistical Abstract of the U nited States and 
Cebula (1979: Ch. 2). These data will be supplied in tabular form by the author upon written 
request. 
2. Or, at least, perpetua1J y non-converging geographic AFDC levels could result. 
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